Susan Brison's book Aftermath is subtitled Violence and the Remaking of a Self., In part, the choice of subtitle reflects the author's intention to chronicle her personal experience of a brutal rape and attempted murder. However, as much as the book draws the reader into the intimacy of the author's experience and her thoughts and struggles during the ten years following, its insights are much broader than the personal or the individual. The book offers more than a story about the remaking of one self but reveals a compelling truth about the nature of the human self more generally and the implication of this truth for dealing with trauma.
consideration of theories of the self. It is, for example, short on citations and references on these subjects. What it offers in place of this typical philosophical approach is a compelling and convincing account of the nature of the self, borne of the experience and struggle that led to these realizations. Hers is not an account founded on theoretical argument alone. Through Brison's reflections, she offers more than another reasoned argument for the nature of the human self. She offers insights into, and truths about, the nature of the human self, accessible only at the margins of human community and the limits of human experience. It is through the study of trauma that Brison argues that the "accounts of the embodied self, the self as narrative, and the autonomous self are compatible and complementary, focusing on different aspects of the self." 5 The insights gained through the experience of trauma "provides additional support for the view that each of these aspects of the self is fundamentally relational." 6 While an unusual approach for a philosopher, it seems appropriate and perhaps unsurprising that the proof of the relational nature of the self would be revealed by personal experience and not by formal logic or theoretical supposition. Such a truth is often obscured in comfortable, safe, and everyday moments where the illusion of independence from others can be maintained because the fact of connection is something presumed, something woven into the underlying reality of life so well that it goes unnoticed. Thus, it is in times when the comfort of the world is shaken, connections broken, and the self shattered that the truth of the self's relational nature becomes evident-and painfully so. This is a truth revealed to, and known by, victims of trauma in other contexts. Victims of violence as the result of war or other human rights violations have found themselves on the outside of human community. They too have discovered the relational nature of the self as they strive to recover and make their way back into the realm of human community. It is a truth that transitional contexts attempting to emerge from pasts marred by violence must contend with if they are to remake a nation.
Brison's book is certain to be good company for those travelling the oft-times very lonely journey to recovery from sexual violence and trauma. It also offers important insights for those seeking to accompany others on this journey individually or collectively through the design of processes and institutions that enable the remaking of these selves. The insights that Brison offers, however, have broader application and implications than the author considers. They extend beyond the remaking of the individual self and are crucial to those who take as their task reconciliation on a collective scale. If violence harms relationships and results in separation severing the connections that sustain and nurture the self, then it is clear that recovery requires connection with others. Just as this is true for the individual who experiences personal traumas it is true for the nation fractured by trauma. If reconciliation is to happen on a national or collective scale, it must first take account of the individuals who make up the collective and their need to remake the self-the relational self.
Brison recognizes that the relational nature of the self has implications for what is needed to remake the self. The remaking of the self requires, according to Brison, the reconstruction of an individual narrative: "Trauma survivors are dependent on empathic others who are willing to listen to their narratives ... Not to be heard means the self the survivor has become does not exist for these others ... This reveals the extent to which the self is created and sustained by others and, thus, is able to be destroyed by them." 7 Brison is clear then about the importance of others to the project of constructing a self-narrative and thereby reconstructing the self for "one can become a human subject again through telling one's narrative to caring others who are able to listen." 8 According to Brison, "[t] his working through, or remastering of, the traumatic memory" is key to remaking the self because it "involves going from being the medium of someone else's (the torturer's) speech to being the subject of one's own."
9 It is further key not only to the remaking but to the survival of the self because "to the extent that bearing witness reestablishes the survivor's identity, the empathic other is essential to the continuation of the self."' 0 Through her identification of these needs of the individual for recovery, Brison offers much to those who work to discern what is needed in transitional contexts, to recover from pasts marred by violence and gross violations of human rights. It helps to make sense of the instincts of those who advocate truth commissions in these contexts as necessary to the remaking of selves and to the remaking of nations. Brison does not, however, acknowledge or recognize the full breadth of her insights. The wider implications of her reflections are obscured by her belief that the trauma of rape victims is different from that of victims of collective trauma like war. She argues that " [u] nlike survivors of wars or earthquakes, who inhabit a common shattered world, rape victims face the cataclysmic destruction of their world alone, surrounded by people who find it hard to understand what's so distressing."" Yet this claim is based on the mistaken presumption that simply inhabiting a common social space makes it possible for victims to hear one another and to recognize their common experience. In the context of oppression secured by violence often in the form of gross human rights violations or indeed in the chaos of war, this commonality is often no more a recognized reality than it is for rape victims who share a common experience of a shattered world and yet remain isolated and alone in that world.
Brison's insights are shared by those who argue in favour of restorative justice-based institutions such as truth commissions, as those institutions best suited to the task of dealing with pasts marred by human rights violations in the course of transition. Brison's record of, and reflections on, a personal experience
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Ibid. at 57. 9. Ibid. at 15. 10. Ibid. at 59. 11. Ibid. at IS. and journey are thus relevant and important to those seeking to deal with recovery from the trauma of the past in transitional contexts. Such institutions are founded on the understanding that reconciliation on a collective scale cannot be achieved without attending to the harms experienced by individual victims. And such institutions recognize that these harms are relational of nature and thus can only be addressed or repaired through the restoration of relationships with a view to remaking the selves at stake. It is only if the call to remake the self is heeded that reconciliation on a collective scale is made possible.
The South African Truth Commission is an example of a restorative justicebased institution that recognizes this truth in so far as it conceives its contribution to reconciliation as one step along this road. Brison's personal reflections help make clear the significance of this contribution to reconciliation-that is, to hear the stories of victims and, in so doing, to honour the subjectivity of survivors and thus secure the possibility of connection with others. Truth commissions then serve as institutions aimed at remaking the self-a crucial step in the remaking of a nation. Indeed, they are founded on the core insight that Brison reveals, namely that " [i] t is only by remembering and narrating the past-telling our stories and listening to others'-that we can participate in an ongoing, active construction of a narrative of liberation, not one that confines us to a limiting past, but one that forms a background from which a freely imagined-and desired-future can emerge.' 12 12. Ibid. at 99.
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10/14/13 KVINFO All About Gender -Articles -Narratives of the traumatized self Delbo's claim is not a response to Descartes' need to prove the existence of a thinking self. It is a response to another question about the self: C an one feel at home in the world? Being at home in the world is one of the fundamental impulses for both philosophy and storytelling, as Hannah Arendt's work has made clear. The attempt to reassure oneself that human beings and the world are made for each other can be viewed as a form of secular theodicy, an affirmation of the meaningfulness of the world, even though this world is a place of suffering and atrocity.
Sto r ie s o f tr a um a tiz e d s e lv e s r a is e a num b e r o f q ue s tio ns : W ha t ha p p e ns to a s e lf whe n the unthink a b le ha p p e ns , whe n o ne is s tr ip p e d o f wha t m a k e s o ne hum a n? Ca n na r r a tiv e s o f tr a um a r e c o ns titute o ur f a ith tha t the wo r ld is within o ur g r a s p a nd tha t we a r e a t ho m e in it? Or d o e s the tr a um a tic lo s s o f c a r e f r e e ne s s f o r e v e r m a r o ne 's a tte m p ts to f ind o ne 's wa y b a c k ho m e ?
The American feminist philosopher Susan J. Brison, who surived rape 10/14/13 KVINFO All About Gender -Articles -Narratives of the traumatized self
2/4
The American feminist philosopher Susan J. Brison, who surived rape and attempted sexual murder, affirms in Aftermath; Violence and the Remaking of a Self (Princeton University Press, 2002) , that narratives of trauma enable one to remake a self that at least some of the time can feel at home in the world. T he b o o k 's p hilo s o p hic a l m is s io n is c a r r ie d o ut b y the p e r s o na l na r r a tiv e , whic h a nc ho r s p hilo s o p hic a l is s ue s in the a c tua l lif e -e x p e r ie nc e s o f e m p ir ic a l ind iv id ua ls --in this c a s e , in the a utho r 's tr a um a tic e x p e r ie nc e s . This approach reflects one of the central contributions of feminist philosophy. If philosophical problems about personal identity and knowledge are thought in relation to concrete selves -including selves who have been raped -then one arrives at rather different theories of the self than if one seeks to disengage oneself from all concrete experiences.
Hence, the question that motivates Brison is: what are the conditions for remaking the self, when she/he has been unmade by trauma and violence? Her answer is that since the self is fundamentally relational, the self can be remade in connection with others. As the psychologist Judith Lewis Herman notes, a traumatic event is one in which a person feels utterly helpless in the face of what is perceived to be a lifethreatening force. Trauma destroys the belief that one can be oneself in relation to others. Working through trauma can only be done in relation to empathic others, who become the keepers of one's story. Br is o n wo r k e d thr o ug h he r tr a um a in the c o nte x t o f r e la tio ns with he r hus b a nd , the r a p is ts , f e llo w r a p e v ic tim s , f r ie nd s , a nd Anchoring philosophical issues in the concrete experiences of violence has implications for other areas of philosophy as well, including epistemology. Whereas philosophers typically argue that in order to have knowledge, one must divest oneself of particular perspectives, accounts by victims of violence lead to very different implications. Take the example of the philosopher who adopted a utilitarian approach to assessing whether the harm to the rape victim outweighs the benefit to the rapist, as described by Brison in chapter one of her book.
There are a number of troubling aspects to this example. First, one might well wonder whether a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis is the most illuminating starting point for considering the ethical implications of rape. Second, even if one were a persuaded utilitarian (and I have met feminist philosophers who are), one would wonder about how to apply a utilitarian methodology to this question. One wo uld ne e d to b e a b le to im a g ina tiv e ly und e r s ta nd wha t the ha r m d o ne to the 10/14/13 KVINFO All About Gender -Articles -Narratives of the traumatized self 3/4 a b le to im a g ina tiv e ly und e r s ta nd wha t the ha r m d o ne to the r a p e v ic tim is --no e a s y m a tte r , s inc e a s Br is o n no te s m uc h o f wha t a r a p e v ic tim g o e s thr o ug h is unim a g ina b le . T hus , no m a tte r wha t m e tho d o lo g ic a l a p p r o a c h o ne a d o p ts , o ne m us t tr y to und e r s ta nd the p e r s p e c tiv e o f the v ic tim o f r a p e . F ir s tp e r s o n na r r a tiv e s a r e e s s e ntia l e p is te m o lo g ic a l to o ls tha t e na b le p hilo s o p he r s to und e r s ta nd d if f e r e nt k ind s o f s e lv e s , a nd the r e b y o p e n up ne w a r e a s f o r p hilo s o p hic a l inq uir y .
Victims of rape experience the unmaking of the self and the loss of the feeling of being at home in the world. As the Serbian feminist and antiwar activist Lepa Mladjenovic writes, rape makes a woman "homeless in her own body" (quoted in Rhonda C opelon: "Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualizing C rimes Against Women in Time of War" in Mass Rape, 1994) . Are there strategies that help one to return home again? Brison thinks that narratives of trauma do enable one to return to this feeling of being at home.
For the traumatized self, narrative serves both to integrate memories of trauma into the survivor's sense of self and view of the world, and to reintegrate the survivor into a community. Brison uses the language of "mastering" and "remastering" a trauma through narrative. The residue of trauma is a kind of body memory. Whereas traumatic memories feel as though they are passively endured, narratives are a result of certain choices. By engaging in a narrative, the survivor takes control over certain aspects of both her story and her memory, and thereby can regain more fully her voice and subjectivity. And by narrating one's past, one is more able to freely construct a narrative of future liberation from this past.
In contrast to Brison's notion of narrative as enabling one to master trauma, remake oneself and ultimately approach the feeling of being at home in the world, C harlotte Delbo's trilogy Auschwitz and After unsettles these ideas. Delbo's account is based on a structurally different situation than the violence that Brison experienced. The presence of sense memory is one of the reasons that Delbo described herself as living next to Auschwitz. "Auschwitz is there, unalterable, precise, but enveloped in the skin of memory, an impermeable skin that isolates it from my present self. Unlike the snake's skin, the skin of memory does not renew itself...." Delbo gives voice to a splitting of self. On the one hand, she remembers every moment of Auschwitz; on the other hand, she does not recognize herself in the self that was in the camp. This splitting of the self attests to the paradoxes of witnessing -its necessity and impossibilityiv. For how can one bear witness to that which is unthinkable, to the arbitrary and inexplicable infliction of brutality that reduces one's choice to that of death or living death? C harlotte feels the dogs' fangs in her own throat and the writer Delbo thereby ruptures narrative form, with its traditional distinction between self and other, life and death, past and present.
W r iting b y s ur v iv o r s o f A us c hwitz a d d r e s s e s the unthink a b le tha t ha p p e ne d no t o nc e , b ut ha p p e ne d o v e r a nd o v e r a nd o v e r a g a in to tho s e c lo s e s t to o ne a nd to tho s e tho us a nd s o f o the r p e r s o ns a nd c o r p s e s tha t p a
In the third volume of the trilogy, The Measure of Our Days, about the survivors' physical return home, the multiplication of individual voices is even more explicit. As the survivors are released from their shared trauma, the "I" is sometimes C harlotte, sometimes Gilberte, Mado, Poupette, Marie-Louise, Ida, Jacques, and others. The varied fates of the returnees show that accidents of fate are decisive for survivors' 10/14/13 KVINFO All About Gender -Articles -Narratives of the traumatized self 4/4 the returnees show that accidents of fate are decisive for survivors' attempts to live. Does one marry prince charming who turns out to be a man who will cheat and desert one? Is one's husband a man who will memorize every detail of his wife's camp experiences, making her memory into his own? Does one marry a man who is himself a survivor and who lives as if he were the only survivor in the family? Does one return to one's father alone, having witnessed the death of one's sister in the camp? Is one falsely suspected of having been a collaborator and shunned for years by one's former comrades?
Giv e n the v a r ie ty o f f a te s tha t De lb o p o r tr a y s , I f ind the no tio n o f " m a s te r y " o f tr a um a s ug g e s te d b y Br is o n's inte r p r e ta tio n o f na r r a tiv e d if f ic ult to a p p ly to De lb o 's te x t. T he ho r r o r s o f the c a m p s c o ntinue to d is o r ie nt b o th the " I " a nd the r e a d e r , a nd r e s is t inte g r a tio n into the " no r m a l" lif e o f e a r ning a liv ing , k e e p ing a ho us e , a nd r e a r ing a c hild . T he p a r a d o x e s in s ur v iv ing a tr o c ity a nd b e a r ing witne s s to it a r e a llud e d to b y the p a r a d o x e s within the te x t its e lf . The knowledge gained in the camps is "useless" knowledge -useless for living -though also "a deeper, more trustworthy knowledge" by which one could see everything in a person's face the moment one set eyes on them.
C an narratives enable survivors to return to a feeling of being at home in the world? C an they deepen the reader's/listener's understanding of what is possible in the world? Both Susan Brison and C harlotte Delbo answer the second question in the affirmative. But they struggle differently with the first question. The anthropologist Michael Jackson describes in The Politics of Storytelling (Museum Tusculanum Press, 2002 ) the intelligibility of a story as depending on the "unconscious bodily rhythm of going out from some place of certainty or familiarity into a space of contingency and strangeness, then returning to take stock."
Brison's personal narrative follows this structure. She is raped in a foreign country, returns home, and through narrative seeks to master the trauma and remake herself. Nonetheless, she cannot sustain the belief in irreversible repair and her renewed feeling of being at home is constantly at risk. Although Delbo's text follows this literal form of storytelling as well (arrest and deportation, camp experiences, and return to home), she nonetheless resists the attempt to provide narrative mastery of traumatic events. She writes, "A child gave me a flower / one morning / a flower picked / for me / he kissed the flower / before giving it to me / and asked for a kiss /...There is no wound that will not heal / I told myself that day / and still repeat it from time to time / but not enough to believe it." (Delbo, Both philosophy and storytelling may renew our faith in the world and reassure us that we can feel at home in it. But they must also give voice to the profound dislocations that continually rupture this reassurance. As Brison and other feminist philosophers illustrate, personal narratives do effectively anchor reflection in concrete experiences, with profound implications for philosophical theories. But these narratives must themselves resist the impulse to master that, which is unmasterable. Delbo's work provides a remarkable example of how the self that is split retains the sense of contingency and strangeness in the world, which makes impossible a return to the certainties and familiarities of being at home.
Robin Schott, Ph.D., is feminist philosopher based in Copenhagen. victorious French, pass through his native village' (Gooch, 72), and appears to have backed off engaging with the political present. His famous wish merely to show how things actually were was seen by the historian Heinrich Leo as a 'timid avoidance of personal views' (Gooch, 98). What more centrally characterized the foundations of historical science, according to Gooch (13), was not some version of information-preserving inference to the best explanation analysable in Bayesian terms but 'the liberty of thought and expression, the insight into different ages, and the judicial temper'. While there is no doubt that Ranke's critical approach to sources became increasingly influential through his many pupils, Ranke's own passionless detachment was rarely followed and historiography as a discipline in Germany, while notable for its political motivation both before and after Ranke, was increasingly feverish as it developed the selfunderstanding of German nationalism (McClelland, . If there was a developing consensus among historians in Germany (consensus in England came later), there was more consensus on this than on focusing on 'the dust of archives' (Gooch, 101). The 'rise of German nationalism' is sometimes given as a one-line answer to the cause of the Great War; it was itself a response to the Napoleonic wars. We may disagree about the connection between Auerstdidt in 1806 and Auschwitz in 1940 but we had best not consign the moral and political judgments which are inevitably involved in the historical understanding here to mere 'superstructure', nor think that cognitive values are not values. It seems clear to me that different cognitively sound histories can be written about the development of the Rankean approach to history. There may not be a best explanation. Tucker brings philosophical assumptions to his history which lead him to seek features of a Kuhnian paradigm; I-and I claim no merit for the approach-have sought here something more political. Truth-whatever philosophical sense we make of that-is best seen as the answer to a question. Collingwood saw it that way. We each put history to the question in our own ways, and there is no one right question to ask. Consistently with this I affirm the importance of Tucker's book. His is a question worth asking.
Jonathan Gorman
Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self By Susan Brison Princeton University Press. 2002. $29.25 In Aftermath Susan Brison describes her recovery from a sexual attempted murder. Because she is a philosopher, it is as a philosopher that she seeks to recover, so her account includes her struggles with our discipline along the way. The book was written over a long period, and includes changes of opinion about identity and recovery, and changes in the foci of Brison's concern. In Chapter 1, which is angry and univocal, Brison describes the assault on her as a hate crime, and describes her recovery as a restoration of a coherent, unified self through the construction of a heard, autonomous narrative of her trauma. As she discovers, far from confirming that all knowledge is good, the knowledge confronted in the true narrative of a trauma may 'fill you with incapacitating terror and then uncontrolled rage ' (p. 20) . Nevertheless, it must be faced because recovery is impossible without it, and because it makes you stronger.
In Chapter 2, Brison tackles the view that 'the personal' has no place in philosophy. Her reasons, of course, are both personal and philosophical (Brison does not dwell on the personal reasons in Aftermath, but is open about them in conversation). During her recovery, she was told that her work on sexual violence was not philosophical enough to count for tenure. This added insult to her injury, and it shames our profession that it could be done in the name of philosophy. We share a duty to ensure that it cannot be done again. Brison's need to make philosophical sense of what had happened to her was absolute, "a matter of life and death", as she put it to me, and it was the clear moral duty of philosophers around her to respect and support this work she had to do. It is a tribute to Brison and those who helped her, that she did not sink into despair and leave philosophy, or dissipate her energies in public anger and blame. Instead, she uses philosophy to expose the philosophical mistakes underlying the view used to harass her, and makes a positive philosophical case for philosophical engagement with the personal.
The first mistake in denying that the personal can be proper topics of philosophy, Brison argues, is inconsistency: if war and abortion are proper topics, how can murder, assault and rape fail to be? The second mistake is imagining that an 'impersonal, acontextual' stance for philosophy is even possible, let alone ideal. Scratch any piece of 'pure' philosophy, and you will find the very specific preoccupations of a particular man at a particular time and place. Brison goes on to make a positive case for philosophical attention to personal experience. First-personal narratives of experience are needed to 'expose previously hidden biases in subject matter and method'; to 'facilitate empathy with those different from ourselves', and to 'lay on the table our own biases' (p. 26). There are specific dangers, but the way to deal with them is not by flight to the impersonal. Rather, it is by their more careful, self-reflective and critical use. The first danger is that the narrator may claim excessive authority to speak for a group, as when Brison might be tempted to speak for all victims of attempted sexual murder. The second, is that first-personal experiences may be treated as foundational, beyond doubt and critique, as Descartes' meditations have been used. The third and fourth dangers are specific to victimhood. Victim narratives may trigger counter-narratives, as when claims of feminists shape counter-narratives about the suffering of men. And narratives of victimhood may perpetuate negative stereotypes about the victim's group, as when the story of a rape perpetuates the idea that women are to-be-violated.
Brison may underestimate the fourth danger. When I first heard of Brison, in a full-page article in The Guardian headlined as the violent rape of a young woman philosopher, her story seemed to me just to add to the pile of salacious stories of sexual violence that dominate the media, feeding a male appetite for stories of harm to women-the more 'pure' the women, the more extreme the degradation, the more fully reported and satisfying the story. (A middle-class philosopher makes an only slightly less exciting victim than a virginal nun.) Brison focuses on resisting stereotyping of the victim as helpless, 'by rejecting the dichotomy between victimization and agency, avoiding sensationalist accounts, and refraining from appearing on talk shows in which sleaze is valued over truth' (p. 35).
If negative stereotyping as helpless were the only worry, this might be enough. But how are negative stereotyping as deserving, and as exciting, to be prevented? Many victims are deterred from the healing narration of their suffering for those reasons, rather than from fear of being seen as helpless. A narrative which integrates suffering into ongoing life is the only way to heal trauma. Silence is no more use than inarticulate grief and rage, and even less use than flight to the impersonal. One way to meet the danger might be to make victim-narratives much more common. If we fill the public domain with them, how will any illicit thrill remain? In the face of the sheer diversity of victims, harms and perpetrators, how will the cruel notion that some groups of victims deserve their suffering be maintained? The persistence of negative stereotypes of women is a sad tribute to the persistence and ingenuity of patriarchy. But more telling, not less, may be the only way to drive negative stereotypes into the dust where they belong. Brison's own narratives can be seen as first steps in the right direction. In Chapter 3 Brison returns to the theme of self and recovery, exploring the connection between narrative, speech and subjectivity, and emphasizing the social aspects of the being, harming and restoration of the self. In Chapter 4 she discusses the problems faced by trauma victims in telling what has happened to them-the need for action, and the pervasive, impossible double bind that victims face: if you are composed enough to be able to tell about your trauma competently, then you can't be that traumatised, and you probably bear some responsibility and guilt, so you will not be taken as a victim. But on the other hand, if you are so damaged by your trauma that you cannot tell about it competently, then you will not be taken seriously as a victim either. Brison here raises the possibility that passivity-allowing that one is helpless, ill, in pieces and needing to be acted on-may be a precondition for the recovery of the capacity for effective agency (p. 83).
By Chapter 5, Brison's conceptualization of her trauma has broadened, and she considers the range of narratives available to capture it. She is now safe enough to notice how earlier on she felt bound to pick and hold on to just one narrative for purposes of getting her assailant convicted, and another one for purposes of presenting the trauma as a philosophical problem about gender-hate-crime and self-hood. She notices how the different narratives of the experience fit into culturally available 'scripts': rape, attempted murder, sexual murder as entertainment. She worries that her narratives might feed what she calls the 'pre-memories' of rape of all women in our culture, and add to the burden of 'post-memories' of historic wrongs that we all carry. She worries, but in the end decides that the obligation to tell is overriding. Failure to tell is dangerous; others need to know what happened, and need to be recruited to the fundamental ethical work of ensuring that 'never again'. In Chapter 6, Brison's commitment to a single narrative of trauma, and the idea of healing as recovering a linear, orderly history and a capacity to go on in the same way is further loosened, as she adds more reasons why telling is essential. A failure to tell-however raggedly and provisionally-makes it impossible for the self to recover-instead, it is doomed to be forever 'clenched'-holding on to the trauma, remembering it over and over again, until it finds a space where safe, heard telling is possible (p. 106-7; p. 115).
The question which leads us to, and through, Aftermath is, roughly, 'how does one carry on living after a horror like that?', but in the final chapter and afterword the question dissolves into a simpler, more general one, 'how does one carry on?'. For in the end, the book includes not just the terrible assault on Brison, but the suicide of her brother, the barelyreported murder of two black PhD students at Dartmouth, and the murder just as Aftermath was completed, of Brison's mentor-someone who had given her hope to continue her career. We are forced, in the face of these sparely narrated further shocks, to face the fact that there is never just one trauma. Rather, trauma is all around us, all the time. In extremis all our narratives of self give out, 'meaning flows away like blood' (p. 122), and all that is left is human, animal life with its push and pull of despair and hope. The idea of recovery as recovery of control is one that Brison now rejects, arguing that what is needed in the face of uncontrollable terrors of such magnitude is not control, but its opposite-letting go, accepting, feeling your way. The later pages of the book offer a vision of hope as a will 'to believe that there ... might be such a thing as irreversible repair' (p. 116).
Although Brison renounces the idea of a fixed point of clarity in recovery, or a single right stance in relation to evil, when she contemplates telling her son about her trauma, her ethical vision becomes more definite. How provisional is that definiteness, I wonder? Might it rather be foundational? As she gathers herself to introduce her son to the horrors of the world, of which her trauma is only one, Brison articulates what might just be a unique moral imperative: help your children be safe. She seeks a telling for her son which will enhance 'not the superhuman ability to avoid life-threatening disasters, but, rather, resilience, the capacity to carry on alive in the present, unbound by dread or regret ... the will to say, whatever comes, Let's see what happens next.' (p. 117). The place where Aftermath leads us is a very human place, and Brison's eloquence as she speaks from it is shaming. Why have so few philosophers dared to speak of suffering and recovery, when these are unalterable facts of the human condition, as brute as the facts of agency, penalty and reward to which we so much more eagerly attend? Soran Reader language are dislocated, demanding new ways of speaking, writing, being.
1 "The challenge of finding language that is true to traumatic experience . . . is a daunting one," Brison writes. "How can we speak about the unspeakable without attempting to render it intelligible and sayable?" (xi). Her own book is testimony to her struggle to find such language and to the success of that struggle. Cornell's book in turn traces in its very shape, organization, and language a similar endeavor to find language for unspeakable losses. The analytically trained philosopher Brison suggests, quoting Ursula K. LeGuin, that her strategy of resisting some scholarly conventions in her discipline might be "rather in the feminist mode" (xii).
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In fact, these two volumes suggest that, for women, representing the extreme or the traumatic requires feminist modes that address the disparities and relations between the philosophical and the theoretical and the autobiographical and the testimonial-and most crucially, modes that enable engagement with cultural representations of gender and sexuality. Before the trial of Brison's rapist, the French prosecutor cautioned her that "when the trial is all over, you must forget that this ever happened" (86). Recalling this injunction, Brison remarks, "Perhaps he could have forgotten, but given the stories of rape I'd grown up with and the ones I'd heard about and read again and again in adulthood, one might say I remembered the rape before it happened, as a kind of postmemory . . . informing the way I lived in my body and moved about in the world" (86). While she has neither desire nor capacity to forget the assault that nearly took her life, she finds that many of those around her do; her own recovery is affected by the expectations of others that she will go on as before, that nothing has really changed. Her narrative tells of the isolation the experience of violence brings. She reaches out to her community, takes self-defense classes, and joins a survivors' group but finds that the assault has left her, as she says at one point, "as though I'd somehow outlived myself" (9). As is the case for many survivors of traumatic experience, Brison finds that the assault created a break in her sense of identity as continuous and integral: "The trauma has changed me forever, and if I insist too often that my friends and family acknowledge it, that's because I am afraid they don't know who I am" (21). Her book simultaneously enacts and explores the relation of narrative to selfhood as she examines how violence disrupts the stories we tell ourselves of who we are in the ❙ Book Reviews world. Brison wants to understand how violence, in her words, unmakes the self and how the practice of memory, in her case literally re-membering, can remake it. If this book is testimony to the structure of violent experience, it also stands as an intellectual autobiography, for Brison's project of reassembling a self unmade by trauma involves a reexamination of the philosophical tradition in which she was trained. She writes as both a woman who has undergone sexual assault and as an analytic philosopher; much of her book can be understood as an attempt to bring these two parts of her life together, and her writing limns the difficulty of doing so. "We are trained," she writes, "to write in an abstract, universal voice and to shun first-person narratives as biased and inappropriate for academic discourse" (8). Yet she finds the methods and assumptions of the analytic tradition, particularly those pertaining to selfhood, language, and what constitutes an appropriate object of philosophical attention, inadequate to an exploration of her own experience and to the impact of violence on the self more broadly. Struggling with a philosophical discourse whose methods and assumptions silence her, she embarks on a journey that is intellectual and personal into recent writings on the traumatic, Holocaust testimony, and the work of feminist theorists and activists.
Toward the end of her book the survivor and the philosopher come together in an astute if painful irony: "Recovery," she writes, "no longer seems to consist of picking up the pieces of a shattered self (or fractured narrative). It is facing the fact that there never was a coherent self (or story) there to begin with" (118). Surviving violence lays bare the artificiality of the coherent stories we tell ourselves about who we are and where we are going. But Brison also suggests that surviving makes an ethical demand. This is what motivates her telling of her own story in such a direct and honest way.
The ethical demand of survivorship shapes Cornell's Between Women and Generations as well. Cornell's survivorship is of a different sort; the ethical demand is that specifically articulated by her mother. Like Brison, Cornell is engaged in a quest to speak the unspeakable. Her book is shaped not simply by her mother's death, however, but by the fact that her mother chose to die. Cornell asks what it means to bear witness to another's death, a question taken up by philosophers such as Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, who have been central to her prior work. Here she wants to explore how the shape of that question changes when the other is one's mother, who, in the face of inexorable illness, chose to take her own life. But, as Cornell notes, "this is not a book about the right to die. . . . I leave those . . . to be written by people whose mother did not choose to exercise that right" (xviii). Instead, Cornell acknowledges that the elder woman made a choice that she felt was her own, perhaps for the only time in her life. Between Women and Generations springs from this deeply disturbing acknowledgment. A strange and at times confusing book, it performs a work of mourning by questioning what this recognition of another woman's life-and death-choices might entail. Mourning becomes a quest for redemption, as the task of bearing witness to her mother's dignity in death leads Cornell to argue for the importance of feminism as a broad concept of dignity, developed through autobiographical reflections, an engagement with feminist readings of psychoanalysis and Kantian philosophy, and ethnographical-style interviews with members of a housecleaner's collective.
The first chapter of the book is autobiographical; the second takes up psychoanalytic theory, specifically guided by the work of the Lacanian analyst Judith Gurewich. The third chapter moves on to a complex reading of the Kantian sublime, and the fourth and fifth chapters discuss and present interviews with the women of the Unity housekeeping collective. The sixth chapter returns to the autobiographical and movingly tells of Cornell's mother's last days. The shifts between autobiography, theory, and ethnography mark a tension in the text; it can seem as if this is actually two interrelated books inhabiting the same cover. In a sense, Between Women and Generations is a coauthored work, shaped by the distinctly different claims of Mrs. Cornell, who wanted her daughter to write a book "that members of her bridge class could read" (xvii), and her daughter, who seeks through her work as a feminist theorist to understand the legacy of the older woman's life and death.
One way to read this book might be to think of it as metonymically organized; each chapter leads to the next, not through any traditional narrative or scholarly form of organization but through a network of associations, hinged on the importance to feminist theory and practice of respecting and valuing the differences between and among women. Cornell seeks not so much to say what has been left unsaid but rather to attend to the ways in which "traces can remain for us as what is missing as we begin to measure silence and pay heed to [its] significance" (72). The engagement with psychoanalysis is therefore central. Cornell's concept of dignity involves both a reworking of female development as understood by classical psychoanalysis, in which the girl achieves womanhood via a rejection of the mother and a turn to the father, and more recent feminist theories that emphasize a close and intricate mother-daughter bond. Cornell theorizes an alternative in which mother and daughter could see the other as a separate and in some sense unknowable human being.
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Thinking of the mother-daughter relation as the cornerstone of women's relations across class, race, and geographical boundaries, she seeks to think through how connections between women might be elaborated in terms of this alternative.
Testimony to the dignity of a mother's suicide is made through exploring the ways we might live with, respect, and value others even as we might not fully understand their actions, feelings, and experiences. Cornell shares with Brison a hope that somehow, in finding a language for extreme and traumatic experiences, we might reimagine bonds of community. Shahar writes compensatory women's history to show the position of women within the poor of Lyons (the persecuted Waldensian heretical sect), a task that would not be necessary, she notes tartly, if women "had been included in the leading narratives" (xiv) about the group. Farmer uses her documents to analyze the grid within which gender functioned in the later Middle Ages; her aim is to avoid "constructing simplistic gender categories" (70). Both studies are well researched and written, but Farmer goes further to tease theoretical implications from her sources although, with her small number of cases, those sources sometimes seem too slim to support her statistical arguments.
Shahar's first chapter is a thumbnail sketch of Waldensian history, a father's family: "We were always being observed to see if we would do something Jewish like crucify someone in the backyard." Of high school: "a time of pervasive, massive boredom, boredom as thick as peanut butter, as bland as vegetable shortening... My daydreams, the stories I told myself, were like knitting I carried with me and took up at any odd moment." Of the decision to agree with her second husband's desire for an open marriage: "I thought, when you get a second cat, you don't stop loving the first. Why shouldn't it be that way with people?" Neither of these writers falls into the trap of writing a "recovery narrative." Dworkin is unreconstructed in every way and proud of it; Piercy describes herself as having changed in a general way, become more capable of putting her own writing, and herself, first. "Feminism had given me a spine," she writes of the period when her second marriage was exploding, and "I was no longer the earth mother... everyone's mama." But, to steal Robin Morgan's phrase, she "disowns none of her transformations." She fully conveys the heady excitement of New York in 1968-"like a medieval fair... intense friendships, intense sex, intense politics, intense pleasures, intense terrors." Selfrighteousness and score-settling are almost entirely absent: "I 'hated the factionalism, but I did not hate the people." And when she turns to feminism, she does not tell tales out of school; she seems concerned to keep the peace and preserve the possibility of coalition, rather than to take personal credit. There are many things (specific and general) about the early feminist movement I still want to know, and she could have been more informative or analytical. But I do prefer this approach to the wrangling about exactly who invented which slogan exactly when that has begun to surface elsewhere.
Similarly, Piercy describes the period when she and her second husband chose to "live differently" and yet stay together as a series of politically rational, emotionallv sustainable commitments, rather than some crazy youthful phase. "We believed in honesty... We believed we were making a new world in every way, on every level. Nothing could be taken for granted." She ends this section with "To Have Without Holding," the familiar poem about "love with the hands wide open," which conveys better than prose can that difficult dream of building something together, choosing to love differently but (as Rich put it) with all one's intelligence, not wvith the cunning of the dependent slave who needs the master but with some idea about kinowledge, self-knowledge and k{Cnowl-edge of the other. WXhat wvould a world that truly recognized the idea t-hat most people love and want more than one person, that trying to own other human beings is not the most ethical move imaginable, be like? People trusting each other that much. Well, it was a fine dream in its way, though the world has moved on. F inally, it is my duty as a reviewer tO say that the title of the memoir is .not coy or sly; Piercy does in fact give a very great deal of space to the animals that have shared her life and her various beds from girlhood ("I was an alley child, and my cats were alley cats") to her present menagerie-five at the beginning of the book, four by the end. Cats often understood and comforted and were there for her when humans weren't, and she gives each one full and individual credit. As a woman writing memoir by means of cat life she is far from unique; in fact I was intrigued to learn from the flyleaf that there is even a Library of Congress category called "women cat owners-united statesbiography." (This is the number three subject heading given to Piercy's book; number four is "cats-anecdotes." I'm afraid this is not wholly unfair.)
Writing well and seriously about cats is almost as hard as writing well about sex: there's such a tradition of trite and sentimental associations to overcome; so many existing examples are cutesy, or smug, or self-righteously moralizing, or all three at once. Piercy never falls into the worst excesses of Sarton with her "fur person" and her "dear pussies." But thisdis only the beginning of her work, for Brison intends to take us on a journey through a well-trained and exquisitely nuanced mind, once secure in its ability to make sense of a senseless world, now confronted with an enormous challenge to these skills. The mind is, of course, her own, and her method consists of a sort of counterpoint between lucid philosophical exposition and the insistent descant of the story of her victimhood, recovery and transfor--mation.
Brison's descriptions of the horrors of the first weeks after the assault are absorbing and perceptive. She reflects, for example, on the difficulty others have understanding why so many victims of assault are willing to blame themselves-insist on it,-sometimes. These shocked observers, she writes, "don't know that it can be less painful to believe that you did something blameworthy than it is to think that you live in a world where you can be attacked at any time, in any place, simply because you are a woman." But it is what follows that forms the most original part of her book. She notices that the puzzles that had once preoccupied her have come to seem irrelevant, even nonsensical; thie concerns of her post-assault life seem at times to turn the conventional enterprise of philosophy onto its head. Descartes sought to provoke an epistemological crisis in-his readers by asking them to consider the question "What if I'm dreaming?" Brison's nightmarish experience left her with a wish to escape, rather than produce, a perfect perception, and she finds herself harboring the ironic but anguished query, "What if I'm awake?" Unlike Descartes, who had to "demolish everything and start right again from the foundations" in order to find knowledge, Brison realizes that "I had my world demolished for me." She doesn't say so, but she must have reflected on the luxury enjoyed by those who might wish for such a demolition, merely to satisfy their curiosity about the relationship between the world and their minds. B rison is no less engaging when she examines the literature of trauma, victimization and recovery. Her interest in feminist philosophy had drawn her to those subjects even before the attack, despite their distance from the classical concerns of her discipline; they became even more central to her thinking afterward. She is most provocative on the relationship between truth-telling and the other purposes of speaking or giving an account. She acknowledges that a crucial task for a survivor of violence is "living to tell"-achieving some degree of mastery over the recall and recounting of the traumatic story.
Yet as she recalls the pressure to get her story "straight" for purposes of testifying at trial, she concludes that the law-driven imperative to eliminate ambiguities and inconsistencies may hinder the exercise of a more therapeutic form of narration-what she calls "telling to live," and describes as "letting go, playing with the past in order not to be held back as one springs away from it." Narrative, Brison has come to believe, "facilitates the ability to go on by opening up possibilities for. the future through retelling the stories of the past. It does this not by reestablishing the illusions of coherence of the past, control over the present, and predictability of the future, but by making it possible to carry on without these illusions."
And so Brison's journey through shock and sorrow and recovery brings her back, eventually, to some semblance of the intellectual and psychological confidence she had earlier enjoyed, despite her understanding that the truth of the universe is inaccessible to discovery, and that the world will make unknowable d-emands on those who would survive in it. But she has been changed, and she knows it. She has learned, through the lengthy process of healing endured by her body and mind together, that the "ability to feel at home in the world is as much a physical as an epistemological accomplishment." She no longer judges a proposition or a life exclusively by shining the cold hard light of rationality onto it; instead she navigates by the light of "the illusory sense of the permanence of hope." It may be irrational, she concedes, but she wants to believe that "just as there is such a thing as irreparable damage, there might be such a thing as irreversible repair." She does not allude to it, but her account reminded me of the hope that lingered in Pandora's box after all of the catastrophes had dispersed.
One Nunez' three previous novels were about writers. Her first, A Feather on the Breath of God, was about her own beginnings. Its three brief, beautifully honed sections read as if she had much more to say about her messy childhood but, unable to say it with crystalline limpidity, simply left it out. The result is a minimalist, memoirish novel, full of subtle hints and echoes of life in a Brooklyn housing project with a Panamanian-Chinese father who worked as a dishwasher and a German war bride mother in love with finer things-music, literature, fashion. Three daughters of this unlikely couple grow up feeling they don't belong to either parent's world. Mother would prefer the blond, blue-eyed daughters of a German fairy tale. Father only breaks his habitual silence in the presence of other Chinese.
Nunez' tepid second novel, Naked Sleeper, introduced an ethnically generic woman writer trapped in a marriage to a good man, her sleepwalking existence broken by odd spasms of self-destructive behavior, until a sudden act of God or fit of authorial despair forces her to grow up overnight. Naked Sleeper was followed by Mitt: The Marm.oset of Bloomsbuy, a quirky mammalian interspecies love story set against the sad background of a childless marriage-that of Leonard and Virginia Woolf. Mitt feels as if it might be another fanatically discreet memoir, the author's own grief at missed opportunities projected onto the brilliant screen of Bloomsbury. Every sentence rings with crisp authority, but the format is maddeningly small. With For Rouenna, Nunez makes a great leap forward. The writer and her anguish are still part of the formula, but only a small purposive part, once the writer is seized-almost literally-by her subject, a fat, demanding, loud-mouthed, middle-aged woman who wants someone to tell her story while there's still time.
For Rouenna, one of the best American novels I've read in a long time, is about The author is in fact the narrator of For Rouenna, a writer who has reached the age "in a woman's life when to most eyes she is invisible." She lives alone in the East Village with a cat and a rockingchair. She has just ended a seven-year relationship with a man known only as G. She's writing her will. Self-protective, introspective, solipsistic, unnamed, her past a blank, she seems to have won a draft exemption from life itself. She's also a snob, worried her stylish skinny artistic friends may catch her hanging out with Rouenna. When Rouenna asks her to collaborate on a memoir of her year in Vietnam, she dismisses the idea out of hand: "I would never write a book with or for someone else." But the two women continue to meet once a month, oddly drawn to one another. Then Rouenna commits suicide, and the narrator is galvanized by grief and memory to write about her after all. Writing liberates her from her demons. But nothing liberates Rouenna; for her it's too late. In tragedy, since ancient times, the hero and the messenger have different roles. 
